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Conference Overview: Major Themes 
and Directions for the Future
William J. McDonough
This special issue of the Economic Policy Review presents
the proceedings of “Financial Services at the Crossroads:
Capital Regulation in the Twenty-First Century,” a con-
ference hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in
partnership with the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan,
and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
The conference, held in New York on February 26-27,
1998, examined a wide variety of topics: the impact of
capital standards on bank risk taking, new industry
approaches to quantifying risk and allocating capital, pro-
posals for reforming the current structure of capital rules,
and the role of capital regulation in bank supervision.
Although the speakers at the conference took very
different positions on several regulatory capital issues, their
papers all directly or indirectly point to one question:
Where do we go from here? In this overview, I will try to
summarize some of the main themes that emerged from
the papers and discussion. I will then suggest what these
themes imply for the choices facing financial institutions
and their supervisors in the years ahead and for the future
of capital regulation as a whole.
EVOLUTION IN RISK MEASUREMENT AND 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IS CONTINUOUS
Risk measurement and management practices have evolved
significantly since the Basle Accord was adopted in 1988,
and there is every reason to believe that this evolution will
continue. In fact, the papers and discussion at this confer-
ence suggest that change is the natural state of the world in
risk management and that no model or risk management
approach can ever be considered final.
Even in a well-developed risk measurement area
such as value-at-risk modeling for market risk exposures,
innovations and fresh insights are emerging. These
advances are the outgrowth of both academic research
efforts and financial institutions’ day-to-day experience
with value-at-risk models. The papers presented in the
session on value-at-risk modeling exemplify how aca-
demic research can suggest new approaches to addressing
real-world problems in risk measurement.
Evolution is even more evident in the developing
field of credit risk modeling. As the papers in the credit
risk session demonstrate, advances in credit risk measure-
ment are occurring along several fronts. First, financial
institutions are refining the basic empirical techniques that
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developed enhanced methods of evaluating portfolio
effects—effects shaped by credit risk concentrations and
correlations in defaults and credit losses across different
positions—and have improved their ability to measure the
impact of these effects on the overall credit risk exposure of
an institution. In addition, the new empirical techniques
allow financial institutions to assess more accurately the
risk that each transaction contributes to the credit portfolio
as a whole, as well as the risk of each transaction on a
stand-alone basis. Thus, credit risk models, although still
in the early days of development and implementation, have
the potential to deepen banks’ and supervisors’ understand-
ing of the complete risk profile of credit portfolios.
The discussion during the credit risk session
revealed that there are many approaches to credit risk model-
ing and a variety of applications. The diversity of ideas
about credit risk modeling is the sign of a healthy climate
of exploration and development, which should lead to
improved modeling techniques and a more effective use of
models’ output by financial institutions making internal
risk management, capital allocation, and portfolio decisions.
RAPID CHANGES IN RISK MANAGEMENT 
REQUIRE CORRESPONDING CHANGES 
IN SUPERVISORY DIRECTION
The rapid evolution in financial institutions’ risk man-
agement practices presents a substantial challenge to
supervisors. As several of the conference papers make clear,
the impact of supervisory rules and guidelines—especially
regulatory capital requirements—can vary substantially as
the financial condition, risk appetite, and risk management
approaches used by financial institutions change, both
across institutions and for a given institution over time. In
an environment in which financial institutions are develop-
ing new and increasingly complex methods of assuming
and managing risk exposures, regulatory capital require-
ments and other supervisory practices must continually
evolve if they are to be effective in meeting supervisory
objectives. Simply keeping up with innovations in the
measurement and control of risk is therefore a vital task for
supervisors, although merely a starting point. 
The speakers in the opening session of the confer-
ence argued that regulatory capital requirements and other
supervisory actions can have significant effects on the
risk-taking behavior of financial institutions. In response
to capital requirements, banks adjust their risk profiles,
altering the overall level of risk undertaken and shifting
their exposures among different types of risk that receive
different treatments under regulatory rules. Further, the
speakers indicated that each bank’s response to changes in
regulatory capital requirements will depend on the capital
constraints faced by the bank. Banks under more binding
capital constraints may have greater incentives to engage in
“risk shifting” and other practices to reduce the constraints
from regulatory capital requirements. Taken together, these
findings suggest that supervisors must pay attention to the
incentive effects of regulation as well as the evolution of
risk management practice in the industry.
The discussion in several sessions offers a corollary
to this last point, namely, that supervisors have many ways
to adapt their practices in response to industry develop-
ments. They can, for example, build on the incentives that
already motivate financial institutions to improve their
risk measurement and management capabilities. Expand-
ing the use of risk measurement models for regulatory
capital purposes—as some observers now suggest in the
case of credit risk models—is only one way in which
supervisors can take advantage of existing advances in risk
management within financial institutions. Improved risk
management techniques can also enhance the ability of
supervisors to monitor the risk profiles of financial institu-
tions and to assess both the strengths and the vulnerabilities
of the financial institutions under their charge. Although
the focus of this conference is regulatory capital, we should
not lose sight of the fact that supervisors can use innovations
in risk management to deepen their understanding of the
risks facing financial institutions.
“ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL” CAPITAL RULES 
WILL BE INEFFECTIVE 
As financial institutions become more complex and more
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to be ineffective or to induce unintended and undesirable
reactions. Perhaps the most significant theme to emerge
from the discussion at the conference is the idea that such
“one-size-fits-all” approaches to capital regulation will
fail in the long run. Conference participants suggested
that in the future, supervisory practice and capital regula-
tion will be based less on specific rules and prescriptions
and more on a system of general principles for sound and
prudent management. This change will come about in
part because supervisors will find it harder to formulate
precise rules to regulate the increasingly sophisticated
activities of financial institutions. However, a more
important reason for the change—raised in several of the
papers in this conference—is the difficulty of crafting
effective regulatory capital requirements when the cir-
cumstances and characteristics of individual financial
institutions heavily influence the way in which each
institution responds to any particular set of rules. Thus, a
single rule or formula could have quite different effects
across institutions—effects that could diverge markedly
from those intended by supervisors.
This last point was made forcefully in the session
on incentive-compatible regulation and the precommit-
ment approach and in the session on the role of capital
regulation in supervision. Papers presented in both sessions
stressed that effective regulatory capital regimes must take
into account the risk profile and characteristics of individual
institutions. Some participants suggested that this principle
should guide the choice of a scaling factor in the internal
models approach to market risk capital requirements;
others applied it to the choice of a penalty in the precom-
mitment approach; still others related it to the overall
nature and structure of regulatory capital requirements.
This principle also emerged, in a slightly different
form, in the sessions on value-at-risk and credit risk mod-
eling. The papers presented in these sessions used a variety
of modeling approaches, reflecting in part contrasting
views of the objectives of risk modeling. Participants
took different positions on the best method of modeling
market and credit risk and of determining an institution’s
optimal level of capital, suggesting that no single formula
for setting capital requirements would be optimal for all
institutions. 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND SUPERVISORS 
FACE CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE
The issues that I have discussed define the challenges facing
financial institutions and supervisors entering the
twenty-first-century world of supervisory capital regula-
tion. For financial institutions, one key challenge is to
determine how best to measure the types of risk they face.
The discussion over the past two days has highlighted a
number of areas in credit risk modeling that deserve further
attention—including the shortage of historical data on
default and credit loss behavior, the difficulty of compar-
ing models and modeling approaches across institutions,
and the need to develop methods of model validation.
Although these issues are indeed the focus of much atten-
tion, banks and other financial institutions are also
attempting to understand and manage other important
forms of risk—such as operational and legal risk—that are
just as complex and less easily quantifiable. Finally, finan-
cial institutions face the challenge of implementing
advances in risk modeling in a coherent and systematic
fashion, whether for pricing, portfolio management, or
internal capital allocation. 
For supervisors, the most important challenge
involves developing an approach to capital regulation that
works in a world of diversity and near-constant change.
The papers presented at this conference provide evidence of
an active effort to meet this challenge. Supervisory capital
requirements will undoubtedly continue to evolve, reflect-
ing innovations in risk management and measurement at
financial institutions as well as changes in supervisors’
views of the appropriate capital regime. Whatever the
approaches eventually adopted, the next generation of
supervisory capital rules must take into account the vital
role of incentives in determining the behavior of financial
institutions.
Financial institutions and supervisors alike must
consider how the adoption of new approaches to capital
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institutions and the relationship between required capital
and economic capital. To this end, we must address a series
of key questions about capital regulation: What risks
should be covered through capital requirements? How do
we decide on the level of prudence? What is the role of
minimum capital requirements? And what is the supervi-
sor’s role in the assessment of capital adequacy? A number
of the papers given over the past two days have taken up
these vital questions, and the next step is to develop our
thinking on these key issues in a more systematic way.
More fundamentally, we need to give fuller con-
sideration to the purpose of capital, as it is seen by financial
institutions on the one hand and by supervisors and central
bankers on the other. In addition, we need to understand
the relationship between these two perspectives, and to
evaluate how this relationship could influence capital ade-
quacy and the incentives to assume and manage risk under
various regulatory capital frameworks. This task involves
developing a better grasp of the objectives of capital regu-
lation in light of the rapidly changing character of financial
institutions, the availability of new risk management
techniques, and the need for systemic stability.
The challenges highlighted here create a substan-
tial agenda for future research. The need for additional
research, together with the enormous interest that this con-
ference has generated, suggests that it would be wise to
establish a forum for further analysis and discussion of
capital regulation issues. As a first step, a series of seminars
on technical issues might be held. These seminars would be
conceived as an open exchange of ideas rather than a
decision-making or advisory initiative. Such efforts to
foster an ongoing dialogue and to build consensus among
academics, supervisors, and industry practitioners on regu-
latory issues could be extremely beneficial. Certainly, the
resolution of these issues—or the failure to resolve them
in an intelligent fashion—will shape the future course of
capital regulation for financial institutions.
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